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Contributions to Children by Divorced
Fathers*
JAY D. TEACHMAN, University of Maryland
littleis knownaboutthenatureandextentofcontributions
Beyondthepaymentofchildsupport,relatively
women
datafroma sampleof ever-divorced
fatherstotheirchildren.Usingnationallyrepresentative
ofdivorced
takenfromtheNationalLongitudinal
Studyof theHighSchoolClassof 1972,thenatureand extentof various
(in eightareas)provided
offathersseldomor
formsofassistance
bydivorced
fathersareexamined.Themajority
nevermakecontributions
to theirchildren.Fatherswhodo contribute
to theirchildrenhavemoreeconomic
and enjoybetterrelationships
resources
with the custodialmother.In addition,thereis littlesupport
for the
notionthatfatherssubstitute
otherformsof assistance
for paymentof childsupport.Rather,otherformsof
supportareprovidedin additionto makingchild-support
payments.

Concern over the consequences of marital disruption has spurred considerable research,
documenting the negative consequences of marital dissolution for female-headed families
(Garfinkel and McLanahan 1986; Hoffman and Duncan 1988) and the long-term negative consequences for children (McLanahan and Bumpass 1988). At least part of the negative impact
of divorce on women and children can be traced to the loss of economic support from fathers.
Specifically, women with children experience a 30 percent decline in income in the first year
following divorce (Hoffman and Duncan 1988), and divorce accounts for many women falling
below the poverty line (Lerman 1987).
Historically, as it has evolved through the political and legal systems (Kahn and
Kamerman 1988), the central mechanism by which divorced fathers contribute to their children has been court-ordered child-support payments. Yet, recent estimates indicate that
nearly 20 percent of divorced mothers do not have a child-support award (Office of Child
Support Enforcement 1988). Moreover, of women with an award, less than 75 percent receive payment, and the amount of support received is generally below the costs associated
with rearing children (Beller and Graham 1985; Seltzer 1991). Recognizing the centrality of
child-support payments for the economic well being of children following divorce and the
variability in child-support outcomes, considerable research has sought to identify the correlates of child-support award and receipt, as well as the amounts involved (Beller and Graham
1985, 1986; Hill 1984; O'Neill 1985; Peterson and Nord 1988; Seltzer and Garfinkel 1990).
However, almost nothing is known about other forms of social and economic contributions fathers make to their children. In addition to making child-support payments, fathers
can provide economic contributions by purchasing clothing for their children or by assuming
medical and other expenses, resulting in increased material well being of their children. Such
economic contributions also imply greater involvement on the part of fathers as they gather
information about their children (likely through increased contact) and make decisions about
how much to contribute, when to contribute, and in which areas.
Fathers can also elect to participate more or less fully in their children's daily activities,
for example, taking an active interest in their children's schooling. Although the roots of the
* This research was supported by funds provided by the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of
Wisconsin, NSF grant SES-8812215, and a Semester Research Award from the University of Maryland. Research
conducted at the Center on Population, Gender, and Social Inequality is facilitated by a grant from the William and Flora
Hewlett Foundation. Correspondence to: Teachman, Center on Population, Gender, and Social Inequality and
Department of Sociology, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-1315.
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Contributionsby DivorcedFathers
effects are not entirely clear, children from divorced families are more likely to drop out of
high school, experience disciplinary problems in school, and engage in delinquent behavior
(Hetherington, Cox, and Cox 1979; Matsueda and Heimer 1987; McLanahan 1985). These outcomes may be due partly to the lack of participation and supervision on the part of fathers.
Given the paucity of empirical evidence, the first goal of this paper is to describe the
nature and extent of contributions fathers make to their children, including child-support
payments, but with greater emphasis on other forms of assistance. The second goal is to estimate the relationship between selected variables and these contributions.
The third goal is to ascertain the degree to which fathers who provide one form of assistance are likely to provide other forms, with particular attention to competing hyphotheses
about the association between child-support payments and other contributions. One hypothesis holds that contributions are positively correlated because divorced fathers who pay child
support are more likely to have contact with their children (Furstenberg et al. 1983; Seltzer,
Schaeffer, and Charng 1989). Fathers who have contact with their children have both the
information and opportunity needed to provide other forms of assistance.
The alternative hypothesis holds that fathers opt to substitute, not supplement, other
forms of assistance for child-support payments. This occurs because fathers cannot control
how the payments are divided between the personal consumption of the custodial parent and
the children (Weiss and Willis 1985). Congruent with reports from divorced fathers, inability
to control how child support is allocated by the custodial mother might be a primary reason
for not making payments (Haskins 1988). By examining the relationship between child-support payments and other forms of assistance, it is possible to test whether they are substitutes
or complements.

Data
The data are taken from the fifth round of the National Longitudinal Study of the High
School Class of 1972 (NLS). The NLS has followed respondents from their senior year in high
school to early 1986, with intervening follow-ups in 1973, 1974, 1976 and 1979. The original
sample was a stratified random sample of all high-school seniors enrolled in public, private,
and church-affiliated high schools in the United States (Tourangeau et al. 1987). The fifth
follow-up is a subsample of approximately 14,500 cases of the original sample of over 22,000
men and women and contains a supplement gathering detailed information from ever-married custodial parents about the nature and extent of assistance provided by the other parent.
Because very few divorced fathers in the population and thus in the NLS data have custody of
their children, analyses are based on responses provided by mothers.
Respondents in the NLS are followed from approximately age 18 to age 32, a span of ages
over which both marriage and divorce are likely to occur. However, disruptions of late marriages (those that occur after age 32) and marriages of long duration (more than 14 years) are
not observed. Also, women divorced after age 32 are not included. However, the ages covered in the NLS are those at which parents are likely to have minor children. All divorced
mothers in the NLS are included in the analysis, yielding a sample size of 644.
To determine the nature and extent of assistance provided by fathers, mothers were
asked how regularly the spouse provided assistance with: clothes, gifts, vacations, dental care,
medical insurance, uninsured medical expenses, help with homework, and attending school
events. They also were asked to report on child support payments.
The use of reports from one spouse (the mother) introduces downward bias into the data.
Mothers may underestimate the contributions fathers make to their children for at least two
reasons: (1) they lack information about the contributions, or (2) they deliberately downplay
the contributions. The first source of bias is likely to be random across mothers, leading to
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conservativeestimatesof the contributionsfathersmake but not affectingdifferencesaccording to the predictorvariables.
The second sourceof bias is more problematicbecauseit is more likely that motherswill
downplay the contributionsof fathers if their relationshipis poor. This type of bias would,
therefore,artificiallyincreasereporteddifferencesin contributionsaccordingto measuresof
the relationshipbetween the parents.Unfortunately,the data available do not provide any
other assessmentof the contributionsmade by fathers. Thus, reporteddifferencesaccording
to parentalrelationshipshould be interpretedcautiously.
The NLSalso misses individualswho were not in school the springof their senioryear in
high school. Variationin educationand in other variablesis thus truncated. However,this
restrictionis likely to have less impacton ever-divorcedmothersbecausethey are more likely
than never-marriedmothers to have graduatedfrom high school. In general, though, the
higher education of the NLSsample comparedto the United States population means that
fathersare more likely to have the resourcesneeded to provide various forms of assistance,
most likely leading to an upwardbias in the resultsreportedbelow.

Descriptive Results
Responsesfor the regularitywith which each type of assistanceis providedby fathersare
shown in Table 1. Excludingchild support,the results indicate that fathersseldom provide
Table 1 * Regularity
withwhichFathersProvideEachFormof Assistance
(percent)
(N = 644)
Very Regularly to Never
Form of Assistance

Pays for clothes
Pays for presents
Takes the children on vacation
Pays for routine dental care
Carries medical insurance
Pays for uninsured medical expenses
Helps the children with homework

Attendsschool events
Regularityof Child SupportPayments

1

2

3

4

5

5
13
8
13
28
12
2

3
8
4
3
3
3
2

12
20
11
5
5
6
5

15
19
11
5
4
4
6

65
40
65
75
61
76
85

4

3

7

12
75
Regularly Occasionally Seldom Never
43
11
18
28

any given assistance. For only one item, purchasinggifts, have more than 50 percentof the
fathers ever provided assistance. Except for the provision of medical insurance, which is
likely to be included in divorce settlements,fewer than one out of seven fathers provides
assistanceon a very regularbasis. Resultsbasedon a differentscale indicatethat more fathers
have at some time paid child support(almostthree out of four)than have at some time provided any of the other forms of assistance.'
Fathers are somewhat more likely to provide economic assistancethan non-economic
assistance. The proportionof fathers who participatein the schooling of their children is
1. Originally, two measures of receipt of child support were considered: whether support was received in the past
month and the regularity with which support is received. Each indicator is subject to different sorts of response error.
While the indicator of whether support was received in the last month is likely to suffer from recall bias, the indicator of
the regularity of receipt of support more accurately captures fluctuations over time in the father's propensity to make
support payments. There is little substantive difference in results when using the two measures.
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particularly low. Fewer than one father out of 27 regularly assists his children with homework or attends school events. Over 75 percent of divorced fathers have never participated in
the schooling of their children. Slightly more fathers (one out of 12) take their children on
vacation, while a majority of fathers (three out of five) have purchased gifts.
Because it is possible for fathers to provide only a subset of the types of assistance being
considered, the data in Table 2 likely underestimate the percentage of fathers who have ever
Table 2 * Percentof FathersMakingDifferentNumbersof Contributions
Excluding Child
SupportPayments
(percent)

IncludingChild
SupportPayments
(percent)

None
One
Two
Three
Four

31
10
12
11
9

19
16
10
11
10

Five

6

8

Six
Seven

6
5

6
6

Eight
Nine

11

8
6

Number of Different
ContributionsMade

provided any type of assistance. The data in Table 3 address this possibility by presenting the
percentage of fathers who have ever provided different numbers of contributions. The first
column of figures excludes child-support payments, while the second column of figures includes them. More fathers have at some time provided at least one type of assistance than is
evident from considering each type separately. Excluding child support, about two out of
three fathers have made one or more types of contributions, while including child support,
this figure increases to about four out of five fathers. Note, however, that these figures refer to
having ever provided assistance-the percentage of fathers that provide assistance on a very
regular basis would be much smaller. Moreover, the fact that one out of five fathers has never
provided any of the types of assistance speaks to the frailty of father-child relationships outside
of marriage.

Explaining Fathers' Contributions
ExpectedRelationships
The multivariate analysis is designed to identify the key correlates of the provision of
various forms of support and to ascertain whether fathers who provide a given form of assistance are more likely to make other contributions. The expected correlates of support are
suggested by a framework developed by Weiss and Willis (1985). This framework, building on
a microeconomic model of the family (Becker 1981), holds that both parents value their children and each therefore benefits from the other's investments in the children. In a two-parent family, propinquity generally acts to maximize the investments of both parents, so that
either parent enjoys investments in a child, while also making such investments. After divorce, however, fathers lose control over the allocation of goods and services in the children's
household and cannot assume that their economic contributions will be distributed as they
wish between the private consumption of the mother and the children.
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Table 3 * Beta Weightsfrom Resultsof GLSRegressionof VariousFormsof Assistanceon Predic
Child
Supportb

Clothes

Gifts

Dentist

Medical
Insurance

Medical
Bills

Voluntary Agreement
Spouse Relationship
No Visitation
Joint Custsody
Child < 6 at Divorce
Marital Duration

.403*
.041
-.265
-.168
.135
.004

.260*
.155*
-.232
.979*
-.138
- .001

.193
.144*
-.850*
.734*
-.086
.001

.078
.212*
-.264
.690*
-.399*
.001

.394*
.082
-.624*
.268
-.118
.004

.153
.157*
-.192
.893*
-.291
- .001

Divorce Duration

-.003

--.003
.010

-.004*

-.002

-.072

-.021

-.008

--.003
-.178

-.033

Proximity Low

-.605*

-.344*

-.510*

-.443*

-.785*

-.519*

ControlVariables:
Black
Father's Earnings
Mother's Earnings
Mother Some College
Mother College

-.150
.058*
.003
.168
.172

.126
.024
-.008
.046
.089

-.454*
.018
-.002
.222
.148

-.264
.038
.000
.103
.133

-.146
.084*
.004
.279
.077

-.220
.051*
-.005
.134
.057

Number of Children

-.089

-.056

.012

-.026

-.053

-.075

-.030
.061

.008
.139

-.047
.038

-.011
.022

Variable

PredictorVariables:

Proximity

Medium

Mother Remarried
-.031
Father Remarried
.230*
R2
.102*
=
System weighted

.054
.024

-.005*

Notes:
a. Direction of coding for regularity of receipt of other forms of assistance is reversed from that shown in Tab
b. Model for receipt of child support also includes controls for whether child support was awarded at divorce
whether the mother retained a lawyer and whether the divorce occurred in a state with a "no fault" provi
* p < .05.
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Within this framework, a divorced father is expected to contribute more to his children if
he expects greater utility from making contributions than not. The level of utility is based on
the costs and rewards associated with providing contributions. Thus, there is a close link
between the notion of utility maximization within the microeconomic framework and several variants of exchange theory (Nye 1979). In this paper, the costs and rewards of providing
contributions are assumed to be a function of two factors: (1) the degree of emotional and
instrumental interdependency between the father and his children and (2) the quality of the
relationship between the parents.
Stronger interdependency between fathers and children increases utility by elevating satisfaction in fulfilling such interdependencies by providing different types of assistance. In
turn, a good relationship between the divorced parents may increase utility by increasing
interdependencies. It is also likely, though, that a better relationship between parents increases utility by increaseing the father's control over how his contributions are allocated.
The strength of interdependency between fathers and their children is measured by the
following variables: age of the children at divorce, whether visitation rights were granted, the
father's physical proximity, and the time since the divorce. Age of the children at divorce is
used to indicate the time fathers had with their children to make economic and emotional
investments leading to interdependency. Both mothers and fathers are more likely to agree to
visitation rights if the father-child interdependence is strong. Physical proximity, while indicating the opportunity to provide particular forms of assistance (e.g., help with homework),
also measures the opportunity to maintain emotional and instrumental interdependency
through contact. Time since divorce indicates the erosion of interdependency that occurs as
fathers and children develop other interests and responsibilities. It is expected that fathers
with older children at divorce, who have visitation rights, who live closer to their children,
and who have been divorced for less time will be more likely to make contributions to their
children.
The nature of the relationship between parents is measured by the several variables: marital duration, whether the divorce agreement was reached voluntarily, and the mother's report of the quality of the relationship (from bitter to friendly) between the parents during the
divorce. Longer marriages, through greater economic and emotional investments, are likely
to reflect stronger interdependency between mothers and fathers. The divorce settlement is
more likely to be reached voluntarily when the parental relationship is of better quality. A
more direct measure of the quality of the parental relationship, although limited to the time
of divorce, is the mother's report of how friendly she was with the father during the divorce.
It is therefore expected that fathers who were married longer, who entered into a voluntary
divorce agreement and who enjoyed a better relationship with the mother during the divorce
will be more likely to provide various forms of assistance to their children.
The custody arrangement parents made for their children at divorce is also included in
the analysis. Although still relatively rare, the prevalence of joint physical custody has been
increasing (Seltzer 1991)-in the NLS sample about 10 percent of the mothers report that fathers have joint custody of their children. Joint custody is more likely to occur when the
parents enjoy a reasonably good relationship and when fathers and children are more interdependent. As such, it is anticipated that fathers with joint custody will be more likely to make
various contributions to their children. However, the nature of joint custody requires that its
effect be evaluated somewhat differently from the effects of other variables. By the very nature of the custody arrangement, resources are provided to children simply by sharing households so that the effect of joint custody on the degree to which fathers contribute to their
children is likely inflated and must be interpreted cautiously.
The multivariate analysis also contains a number of control variables that might mitigate
the relationship among the covariates discussed above and the provision of various types of
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assistance.These controls include: the socioeconomicresourcesof parents (measuredat divorce), the current marital status of each parent, the number of children, and race.2 The
socioeconomicresourcesof the parentsare included in orderto controlfor the overall ability
of parents to provide for their children.3 The number of children is included to control for
differencesin level of household expenses faced by custodialmothers introducedby variations in household composition. The remarriageof either parent is included to control for
changesin interdependencythat take place as allegiancesare shiftedto a new family and new
boundariesare erected between the father and his children from the first marriage. Race is
includedas a controlon the basisof researchthat indicatesthat blackmothers(at leastamong
women who are ever married)are less likely to receive child-supportpaymentsfrom the father (Bellerand Graham1985).

StatisticalModel
The multivariate analysis is conducted using a simultaneous equation procedure in
which each type of assistanceis made jointly dependentand errorsare allowed to be correlated acrossequations.This is sometimesknown as a "seeminglyunrelatedequationsmodel"
(Pindyckand Rubinfeld 1981). The model is appropriatewhen the dependentvariablesare
conceptuallyrelated. It is hypothesizedthat making child-supportpayments and providing
other forms of assistanceare interrelated. Consequently,it is expected that the errorterms
acrossthe models for each type of assistancewill be correlated. As indicatedbelow, the expected direction of the correlationsacross error terms will vary accordingto whether one
hypothesizesthat fathersuse various forms of assistanceas either supplementsto or substitutes for each other.
The model estimatedtakes the following general form:
Y, =
Yn

=

XL01 + El
Xnin

+

En

where Y1, ... .Y, are the forms of assistance provided by fathers, including child support, X ,
..., X are vectors of predictor variables that may overlap, 1,
in are vectors of parame.-..., terms with
ters associated with the predictor variables and E1,...
En are error
Cov(Ei,Ej)not
restricted to equal 0. The model is estimated using a two-step, generalized least squares procedure (PROCSYSLINin SAS).
The regularity with which child support and each of the eight other forms of assistance
are provided constitute the dependent variables.4 The relationships between providing the
2. Becausethe maritalstatusof each parentis determinedfromresponsesprovidedby mothers,thereis likelyto be
errorin measuringwhetherthe fatherhas remarried.Forthe approximately20 percentof motherswho statedthat they
did not know the maritalstatusof the father,the casesare codedin the zero category(fathernot remarried).Similarly,
when the father'slocationis not known, the proximityis codedas low. Preliminaryanalysesindicatedthat including
separateindicatorsfor whether the motherknew the locationand maritalstatusof the fatherdoes not lead to a better
fittingmodel and does not affectthe parameterestimatesfor other variables.
Moregenerally,there is missingdataon severalof the predictorvariablesincludedin the regressionmodels. The
procedureused to handlemissingdatawas to code the mean value of the variableand includea set of dummyvariables
in preliminarymodelsindicatingwhethera substitutionwas made. In none of the preliminarymodelsdid the missing
data indicatorslead to a substantiallybetterfittingmodel or one that yielded substantivelydifferentresults.
3. Thereare two reasonsfor includingthe earningsof parentsmeasuredat the time of divorce. First,and most
important,the NLSdoes not containa measureof the father'sincome followingdivorce. Second,it is likely that variations in earningspotentialare reasonablywell capturedby earningsat divorce, especiallygiven the relativelyshort
periodcoveredby the NLSdata. Theeducationof fathersis not includedin the modelbecauseof its collinearitywith his
income and the educationand income of mothers.
4. The use of an ordinalscale to measurethe regularitywith which typesof assistanceare providedmay lead to
biased estimatesof coefficientswhen GLSregressionis used. However,least squaresregressionis generallyrobustto
departuresfrom normality. To obtain some idea of the robustnessof the GLSresults,a logisticregressionmodel was
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various forms of support are indicated by the correlations between the error terms of the
model. Positive correlations indicate that fathers who provide at least one type of support are
also more likely to provide other types of assistance. Negative correlations indicate that fathers substitute types of support.

Results
The results from estimating the equations for fathers' contributions are presented in Table
4.5 While there are some minor variations in effects across forms of assistance (some of which
Table 4 * Cross-model Correlations for Dependent Variablesa
Variable

Support
Received

Support
Received

Clothes Gifts

Dentist

Medical
Insurance

Medical
Bills

Vacations

Homework

School
Events

1.00

Clothes

.14

1.00

Gifts

.28

.58

1.00

Dentist

.20

.49

.42

1.00

Medical
Insurance

.33

.35

.43

.56

1.00

Medical
Bills

.25

.51

.37

.67

.52

1.00

Vacations

.24

.52

.52

.41

.35

.38

1.00

Homework

.03

.52

.36

.36

.28

.41

.39

1.00

School
Events

.15

.52

.42

.37

.29

.39

.35

.66

1.00

Note:
a. All correlations except that between support received and homework are significant at p < .05.

would be expected due to chance), the general pattern is clear. Consistent with the expectations outlined above, fathers who enjoyed a friendlier relationship with the mother during
the divorce (for all forms of assistance except child support and medical insurance) and who
reached an agreement on the divorce settlement voluntarily (for child support, clothes, medical insurance, and vacations) more regularly contribute to their children. The effect of propinquity is particularly strong-fathers who live farthest from their children are the least likely
to provide assistance (vacations being the one exception). Time since divorce is negatively
related to the provision of gifts and the payment of medical bills.
Also as expected, fathers who share joint custody of their children are more likely to
provide assistance than fathers not sharing custody (medical insurance and child support being exceptions), although the magnitude of the effects indicate that fathers with joint custody
do not uniformly contribute to their children on a very regular basis. That joint custody does
not affect the payment of child support is not unexpected given the sharing of costs that most
fitted to each of the forms of assistance separately using 1 to indicate that the assistance had ever been received and 0
otherwise. The results (not shown) correspond closely to those shown in Table 4.
5. Several additional models were also estimated due to the possibility that the ambiguous time reference of several questions used in the NLS-72 introduces endogeneity (e.g., providing assistance influences the values taken by the
covariates). Specifically, it is possible that endogeneity biases the effects of proximity of the father and the marital status
of the parents. Using a stepwise procedure to enter these variables in various orders does not alter the pattern of results
for other covariates. Possible endogeneity is not explicitly modeled, because this paper is less interested in partitioning
the direction of causality and more interested in determining whether a relationship holds. Moreover, there is also
concern for the change in the effects of other variables once the additional variables are included.
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likely occurs under this custody arrangement and the resulting latitude that parents have in
structuring if and when one parent will make a monetary compensation to the other parent
(Seltzer 1991).
Neither the age of the children at divorce nor marital duration has a consistent effect on
making contributions. While this may truly be the result of null effects, it should also be
noted that the age of children and marital duration are highly collinear (which is exacerbated
by the fact that a single cohort of young women is being examined). Indeed, the strength of
the collinearity led to the use of a simple dichotomy for the age of children at divorce (at least
one child less than age 6). However, other results (not shown) indicate that neither marital
duration nor a continuous indicator of the age of children at divorce have significant effects
when the other is left out of the model.
Most of the control variables shown in Table 3 have only modest effects on the father's
contributions. Higher income fathers are more likely to pay child support, carry medical insurance, and pay for uninsured routine medical bills but are not more likely to provide other
forms of assistance. Neither the economic and educational resources of the mother nor the
number of children have a consistent effect on contributions from the father. The marital
status of mothers and fathers has little effect on whether fathers provide assistance to their
children except that remarried fathers are more likely to make child-support payments.
The positive effect of the father's remarriage on the payment of child support is contrary
to the expectation outlined earlier in the paper but is consistent with other reports (Beller and
Graham 1985; Hill 1984). It may be that fathers who remarry are more family oriented than
are fathers who do not remarry, leading to the positive impact on child-support payments.
The failure of remarried fathers to provide other forms of assistance may be attributed to the
demands on their time and resources made by their new families.
The cross-model correlations for the equations, shown in Table 4, are all positive (and
statistically significant with one exception), indicating that fathers who provide at least one
form of assistance for their children are more likely to provide other forms of assistance. Note,
however, that the correlations between paying child support and providing other contributions are generally smaller than those observed between other pairs of support (the correlations between support received and both assisting with homework and attending school
events are very small). On one hand, this suggests that a proportion of fathers restrict the
transfer of resources to making child-support payments. On the other hand, these results indicate that if fathers contribute more than just child-support payments, they are likely to provide several types of assistance.
To examine both of these possibilities in greater detail, the extent to which fathers provide more than one form of assistance to their children, conditional on having ever provided
a given type of assistance, is shown in Table 5. The mean number of other forms of support
ever provided is indicated according to whether each type of assistance has at one time been
provided. For most forms of assistance, fathers who have at one time provided the assistance
in question have provided between five to six other types of assistance (including the type of
support being considered). Of particular note is the number of other types of support provided
by fathers who help their children with homework or attend school events. Although these
forms of assistance are relatively rare (see Table 1), the fathers that do provide this sort of
support make a substantial number of other contributions.
At another extreme, a few other forms of assistance are provided by fathers who have
ever paid child support (3.31). This value is much smaller than comparable figures for other
forms of assistance and occurs because a substantial proportion of fathers, about 20 percent
(data not shown), make child-support payments but do not provide other types of assistance.
That is, the mean number of other forms of assistance provided by fathers who make childsupport payments is weighted downward by the proportion of fathers who make child-support payments but provide no other contributions to their children.
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Table 5 * Mean Numberof OtherFormsof AssistanceEverProvidedby FathersAccordingto
WhetherEach Typeof AssistanceHas Ever Been Provided
Mean number of other forms of assistance
Variable

Child-Support Payments
Clothes
Gifts
Dentist
Medical Insurance
Medical Bills
Vacation
Homework
School Events
Mean number of forms of assistance provided:

Ever Provided

Never Provided

3.31
5.54
4.41
6.30
5.23
6.32
5.41
6.87
6.10

1.35
1.20
0.35
1.44
1.15
1.50
1.30
1.88
1.54
2.86

Note: All differences between value for ever provided and never provided are significant at p < .05.

Table 6 * Resultsof OLSRegressionof Numberof Contributionsmade by Fatherson Predictor
Variablesand Controls
Variable

PredictorVariables:
Voluntary Agreement
Spouse Relationship
No Visitation
Joint Custody
Child < 6 at Divorce
Marital Duration
Divorce Duration
Proximity Medium
Proximity Low
ControlVariables:
Black
Father's Earnings
Mother's Earnings
Mother Some College
Number of Children
Mother College
Mother Remarried
Father Remarried
R2

ExcludingChild
SupportPayments

Including Child
SupportPayments

Beta

Beta

.731*
.260*
--.902*
1.133*
-.251
.006
-.004
-.498*
- 1.644*
-.167
.089*
--.019
.224
-.256
.469
-.223
.204
.23*

.877*
.273*
- 1.188*
.929*
-.190
.006
-.004
-.498*
- 1.862*
-.288
.108*
-.018
.297
-.278
.507
-.239
.291
.25*

Notes:
a. Direction of coding for regularity of receipt of other forms of assistance is reversed from that shown in Table 1.
*
p < .05.
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The multivariate analysis is concluded by considering the predictors of the number of
different contributions ever made by fathers. Because the cross-model correlations shown in
Table 4 and the means shown in Table 5 indicate that fathers who provide at least one type of
assistance are more likely to provide other contributions, it is expected that the predictors of
the number of contributions ever made will be similar to those for the regularity with which
individual types of assistance are provided. As shown in Table 6, the pattern of effects for the
number of different contributions made by fathers is indeed very similar to that observed in
Table 3. Fathers who voluntarily agreed to the divorce settlement, who enjoyed a friendlier
relationship with their spouse during the divorce, who live closer to their children, who earn
more, who have visitation rights and who have joint custody all provide a greater number of
contributions. Thus, the factors that lead fathers to make at least one type of contribution
more regularly also act to increase the diversity of the types of contributions they provide to
their children.

Discussion
Using data from a nationally representative sample, I have examined the extent to which
divorced fathers contribute to their children, ranging from clothes to help with homework.
Other than paying child support and buying gifts, the majority of fathers have never provided
assistance to their children. Consistent with other studies which show that divorced fathers
have little contact with their children (Furstenberg et al. 1983), fathers are particularly unlikely to provide assistance that requires their direct participation (e.g., helping their children
with homework or attending school events).
The picture is less dramatic but still telling when considering the percent of fathers who
have at one time provided at least one type of assistance. Other than paying child support,
about one out of three fathers has never provided assistance to their children. Considering
both child-support payments and other forms of assistance, about one out of five fathers has
never provided any form of assistance. While these figures show that a majority of fathers
have provided at least some form of assistance to their children, they also indicate that a
substantial minority have never contributed to their children (at least with respect to the
forms of assistance considered in this paper). Moreover, the figures refer to having ever provided assistance, ignoring the regularity with which contributions are made. For example,
none of the fathers in the NLS sample has provided each of the types of support on a very
regular basis (data not shown). Including child-support payments, only 50 percent of the fathers have provided at least one type of assistance on a very regular basis (data not shown).
One consequence of this pattern is that children from disrupted families are more likely
to experience some form of deprivation than children from intact families. Subsequent research needs to more clearly document the parameters of this deprivation, its long term consequences, and the role of various types of contributions from fathers in alleviating deprivation.
It would also be useful to obtain a better understanding of the socioemotional consequences
for children of variations in the nature and extent of contributions made by fathers.
While not the central focus of this paper, the effect of joint custody on the provision of
assistance is also interesting to note. With the exception of paying child support, it is clear that
fathers who share physical custody of their children are more likely to transfer resources to
their children. Although this may occur because joint physical custody increases the participation of fathers in rearing their children, such a conclusion must be made with a significant
caveat. Under the current regime of divorce settlements, parents who agree to a joint custody
arrangement are likely to be an unusually select subset of all parents (as noted above, in the
NLS data, joint custody arrangements characterize only about 10 percent of the divorces).
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Attempts to unilaterally increase the prevalence of joint physical custody could result in rapidly diminishing returns in terms of the father's contribution. It remains an open question as
to the nature and extent of this selectivity problem--but a question that is crucial for the
development of policy initiatives.
Despite the generally negative tone of the findings, the data indicate that there is a subset
of fathers who contribute substantially to their children. Both the cross-tabular and multivariate analyses indicate that fathers who regularly make child-support payments supplement those payments with other forms of assistance. There is no evidence to indicate that
various forms of assistance may serve as substitutes for each other.
Finally, the multivariate analysis indicates that objective measures of household socioeconomic status (i.e., mother's education and income, fathers income, number and ages of children) are less important in predicting whether assistance is provided than are indicators of the
parental relationship. The development of policy and programs aimed at maximizing the
contributions to the children of divorce should consider the role played by the parental
relationship.
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Appendix A * Means and StandardDeviationsfor IndependentVariables
Values

PredictorVariables

Voluntary Agreement

Child < 6 at Divorcea
Number of Children
Duration of Marriage
Duration since Divorce
Log of Mother's Income
Mother Collegeb
Mother Some Collegeb
Log of Father's Income
Joint Custody
Spouse Relationship
During Divorce

SD

1 = Child-support agreement reached voluntarily
0 =

Visitation

Mean

Otherwise

1 = Visitation rights not granted at divorce
0 = Otherwise
1 = At least one child < 6 at divorce
0 = Otherwise
Number of own children at divorce
In months
In months
Log of income at divorce in 1985 dollars
1 = College degree or higher
0 = Otherwise
1 = At least some college
0 = Otherwise
Log of income at divorce in 1985 dollars
1 = Joint physical custody
0 = Otherwise
1 = Bitter
2 = Many disputes

.54

.50

.07

.26

.78
1.50
70.67
78.57
6.94

.42
.70
37.74
46.19
4.10

.08

.27

.34
9.17

.47
2.62

.10

.30

2.64

1.09

.14

.35

2.31

1.28

.38

.49

.28

.45

.48

.50

.53

.50

3 = Some disputes

4 = Friendly
Black

1 =

Regularity of Support

0 = Otherwise
1 = Never

Black

2 = Seldom
3 = Occasionally

Proximity Mediumc
Proximity Lowc
Mother Remarried
Father Remarried

4
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

Regularly
Same state or different state < 500 miles
Otherwise
Different state > 500 miles or don't know
Otherwise
Mother has remarried
Otherwise
Father has remarried
Otherwise

Notes: The following variables were used in the equation for making child support payments but not in the equations for
the receipt of other forms of support. Mother Retained a Lawyer at Divorce (1 = No, 0 = Otherwise; mean = .11, sd =
.31); Divorce Occurred in "No Fault State" (1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise; mean = .71, sd = .46); Child Support was Awarded
at Divorce (1 = Yes, 0 = Otherwise; mean = .81, sd = .39); Log of Amount of Child Support Awarded at Divorce (In log
of 1985 dollars; mean = 4.33, sd = 2.29).
a. Age of children at divorce is dichotomized because of the high degree of collinearity with marital duration. Age 6
was used as the age for dichotomization because this is the age at which children begin attending school.
b. Mother's education at divorce was reported in categories. Dummy variable coding is used to capture potential nonlinearities in the effect of education.
c. Father's location was reported in categories that only allow dummy variable coding.
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